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joel westerdale
Fiat homo: Redeeming
Frost via Nietzsche
Robert Frost’s most famous poem — perhaps America’s most famous poem — has lately undergone a makeover. “The Road 
Not Taken” (1916) has long inspired self-help gurus, Madison Avenue ad 
agencies, and graduating valedictorians who read its closing lines as a cel-
ebration of rugged individualism and the hearty pioneer spirit. But recent 
years have seen a shift in the poem’s popular reception. In a 2013 episode 
of the Netflix comedy-drama Orange is the New Black, an inmate invokes 
the poem to justify her unconventional approach to earning parole, only 
to be chastised by another for her naiveté: “Everyone thinks the poem 
means to break away from the crowd and, like, do your own thing, but if 
you read it, Frost is very clear that the two roads are exactly the same. He 
just chooses one at random, and then it’s only later at a dinner party when 
he’s talking about it that he tells everybody he chose the road less travelled 
by, but he’s lying.” The speaker may be on to something: according to the 
poem, the one road is “just as fair” as the other; they are worn “really about 
the same”; they each lay “equally.” Met with only vacant expressions, the 
speaker continues: “So the point of the poem is that everyone wants to 
look back and think their choices matter, but in reality, shit just happens 
the way that it happens and it does not mean anything.” Smugly unleash-
ing her liberal arts education, our privileged inmate echoes interpretations 
of “The Road Not Taken” that have long circulated among scholars of 
American poetry. Decades ago Frank Letricchia pronounced the poem 
“a wolf in sheep’s clothing,” arguing that while it may on the surface 
seem to celebrate the autonomous self, it actually points to the ultimate 
irrationality of the choices that define us. Frost himself called it a “tricky 
poem — very tricky,” claiming in public readings to have based it on his 
friend, the Welsh writer Edward Thomas, with whom he would take long 
walks while living in England, and who, regardless of which path he took, 
would lament he did not go the other. If the only thing distinguishing 
one road from the other in the poem is simply the fact that one is taken 
while the other is not, the choice of one over the other hardly seems 
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evidence of the speaker’s nonconformity, and representing it as such, as 
he imagines he will one day do, would appear to be disingenuous.
Though the fictional jailhouse crowd may prove unreceptive to this 
reading, it has found purchase in the outside world, largely with the help 
of David Orr’s 2015 book, The Road Not Taken: Finding America in the Poem 
Everyone Loves and Almost Everyone Gets Wrong (Penguin). Orr, a poetry 
columnist for the New York Times, distinguishes between the naive reading 
of the poem that has long dominated the poem’s popular reception and 
which bills it as a paean to individualism, and the cynical reading, which 
sees it as a study in self-deception. As per the book’s title, the popular 
reading “gets it wrong.” Getting it right, however, comes at a cost. While 
cynical readers, like the astute inmate, may revel in their cleverness, their 
reading largely reduces the poem to a melancholic parody. Neither the 
naive nor the cynical reading is particularly appealing; nor is either on its 
own particularly compelling. Noting this, Orr promotes an interpretation 
that suspends the poem’s audience between the two readings. You go down 
one road, and the poem is a naive celebration of individualism; you go 
down the other, and it becomes a cynical denunciation of self-deception 
in retrospection. By suspending itself between these two possibilities, the 
poem instantiates the quandary it portrays — situating the reader in the 
position of the lyrical subject who must choose one road or the other but 
cannot pursue both. For Orr, the conflicting interpretations reveal much 
about the American psyche and the way it understands itself as a product of 
the choices we make, even when those choices are not as sovereign as we 
like to pretend. Such a reading accommodates both the naive, starry-eyed 
nonconformist as well as the cynical inmate, all in a manner palatable to 
college professors weaned on irony and lyrical performativity. 
And yet, even if scholars reading the poem as a symptom of Ameri-
can culture may want to keep this poem suspended, such a reading both 
relies on and belies the desire of individual readers — who want the 
poem somehow to land. The poem itself may reproduce the quandary 
it describes, but any reader who keeps its meaning suspended refuses to 
do precisely that which the poem says must be done, that is, to make 
a choice. A reading which would suspend judgment already tacitly ac-
knowledges that neither option on its own is particularly compelling. 
There is, however, another avenue of interpretation — one that, like 
Frost’s poem, recognizes the impulse to reinterpret the past, but does so 
without yielding to cynicism or resorting to irony. This mode of reading 
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finds precedent in a figure with little connection to Frost beyond a shared 
regard for Emerson; a figure whose own self-representation has aroused 
suspicion; a man who proclaimed “I am not a man — I am dynamite!” For 
all his eccentricities, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) offers a positive mode 
of reading one’s past that recognizes the perspectival nature at the root of 
any account of the self and sees this not as a liability, but as an opportunity. 
The approach Nietzsche takes to his own past furnishes a way to read Frost’s 
poem that enables the work to retain the empowering declaration of 
autonomy espoused by the naive reading, while taking into consideration 
and moving beyond the cynicism that informs the poem’s recent reception.
In the three years before the collapse that ended his productive life, 
Nietzsche entered into a sustained phase of self-reflection at least par-
tially informed by material concerns. In 1886, E. W. Fritzsch of Leipzig 
had purchased from Ernst Schmeitzner the rights to and, importantly, the 
many unsold copies of Nietzsche’s earlier works, including The Birth of 
Tragedy; Human, All Too Human; and The Gay Science. While C. G. Naumann 
was publishing his current writings, such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond 
Good and Evil, and The Genealogy of Morals, the purchase and promotion 
of the earlier works by Fritzsch presented Nietzsche with the opportu-
nity to revisit them anew. Based on Nietzsche’s correspondence with 
Fritzsch and the many emendations to be found in the author’s personal 
copies of these earlier works, Nietzsche clearly would have preferred to 
revise them, but much to his dismay, the publisher would not allow it 
until the remaining printed copies were sold. What he could do was 
write new prefaces or append new material. The body of the texts, how-
ever, were already printed and could not be altered.
This presented Nietzsche with a quandary, for the philosopher’s 
thought had undergone significant transformation in the years since he 
had written these works. No longer was he the Romantic Nietzsche of 
The Birth of Tragedy, who saw the promise of redemption in the works of 
Richard Wagner, nor was he any more the scientifically-inclined aphorist 
of Human, All Too Human and The Gay Science, whose ability to topple 
temples outstripped his capacity to erect alternative architectures. Now 
he was the philosopher of the Will to Power and the Eternal Recur-
rence of the Same, the author of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and father of 
the Übermensch. The earlier works, while still recognizably by Nietzsche’s 
hand, stood on the other side of a conceptual watershed. Still, Nietzsche 
would not renounce them. He would, however, reinterpret them for his 
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readers. Thus arise the new prefaces for The Birth of Tragedy, Human, All Too 
Human I and II, Daybreak, and The Gay Science. There were other amend-
ments (for instance, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music became The 
Birth of Tragedy, Or Hellenism and Pessimism through the addition of a new 
title page; and The Gay Science gained an entire fifth book of aphorisms), 
but with the new prefaces, Nietzsche did not alter his earlier works so 
much as resituate them from the perspective of his later philosophy. This 
exercise in self-representation would culminate in Nietzsche’s last com-
pleted manuscript, Ecce homo, Or How One Becomes What One Is.
Completed in late 1888, shortly before the collapse that would end his 
productive life, Ecce homo marks what should have been a turning point in 
the middle-aged philosopher’s career. In it he pivots from all but his most 
recent works and prepares the ground for his upcoming yet ultimately 
unrealized grand project, The Revaluation of All Values. Even as he moves 
beyond them, he does not altogether abandon these earlier publications. 
This is clear from the unambiguous title of Ecce homo’s third section, “Why 
I Write Such Good Books.” As with the new Fritzsch editions, he does 
not set out to change these works, but to find a way to affirm them. This 
enthusiastic affirmation is the hallmark of Ecce homo, and is also apparent 
from the titles of the book’s other three sections: “Why I Am So Wise,” 
“Why I Am So Clever,” and “Why I Am a Destiny.” Such titles easily 
arouse suspicions of megalomania, appearing to be early indications of the 
philosopher’s pending mental breakdown. Yet what may seem a symptom 
of oncoming madness is in fact entirely consistent with the method of 
self-reflection and self-portrayal Nietzsche lays out explicitly at the outset 
of Ecce homo, and which accounts for the affirmation with which he greets 
all his works, however superannuated.
Nietzsche launches Ecce homo, which he began writing on his forty-
fourth birthday, with a statement that reveals the method he will pursue 
in this self-study:
On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the 
grapes are turning brown, a shaft of sunlight has just fallen on my life: 
I looked backwards, I looked ahead, I never saw so much and such 
good things all at once. . . . How should I not be grateful to my whole life? 
And so I tell myself my life.
Thus begins the account of a man compelled to retire early because he 
was plagued by migraines and nausea, a transient whose ceaseless search 
for relief from somatic distress separated him from friends and family and 
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colleagues, a scholar whose deteriorating eyesight threatened his chief 
occupations of reading and writing, a writer whose unsold books lay 
gathering dust. This man is grateful not only for the good life brought 
him, but for his whole life: his ill health, his loneliness, and even those ear-
lier books that he would at this point actually rather revise, but may not.
This is not just a statement of affirmation; it is a declaration of method. 
Such is evident in the passage’s final, somewhat odd statement: “And so I 
tell myself my life” — “Und so erzähle ich mir mein Leben.” Others have read 
this “so” sequentially (as in, next I’m going to tell myself about my life) or 
conclusively (and therefore I’m going to tell myself about my life). But the 
more natural reading of the original German is unambiguous: “And in this 
way I tell the story of my life to myself.” Read thus, Nietzsche makes it 
clear from the outset that Ecce homo is quite deliberately written to reflect 
a spirit of gratitude derived from this single moment. Here Nietzsche ex-
emplifies the concept he claims lies at the heart of Ecce homo, namely the 
unconditional affirmation he calls amor fati, the love of fate. His “formula 
for human greatness,” as he calls it, is this: “not wanting anything to be dif-
ferent, not forward, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just enduring 
what is necessary […] but loving it.” By embracing his own past, includ-
ing those works he has effectively put out to pasture, Nietzsche affirms 
even that which he might otherwise be tempted to want to change; he 
renounces the desire to alter a past over which he has no power.
This notion of amor fati has its roots in one of Nietzsche’s more no-
toriously perplexing concepts, the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. The 
latter finds its most concise formulation in the penultimate aphorism of 
The Gay Science’s original edition, where he presents the following hy-
pothetical situation: 
What if a demon crept after you into your loneliest loneliness some 
day or night, and said to you: “This life, as you live it at present, and 
have lived it, you must live it once more, and also innumerable times; 
and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and 
every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great 
in thy life must come to you again, and all in the same series and se-
quence . . . ” — Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your 
teeth, and curse the demon that so spoke? Or have you once experi-
enced a tremendous moment in which you would answer him: “You 
are a God, and never did I hear anything so divine!”. . . [H]ow would 
you have to become favorably inclined to yourself and to life, so as to 
long for nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning 
and sealing?
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Immediately thereafter Nietzsche introduces the figure of Zarathustra 
into his writing, closing the first edition of The Gay Science with the ap-
pearance of the mage.
In the course of the book to follow, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
has his title-figure present the affirmation of the past as one of the greatest 
challenges confronting the Will. It is where the Will “gnashes its teeth”; 
it is its “loneliest affliction,” for the Will is “powerless against that which 
has [already] been done.” Past choices cannot be unmade. Redemption, 
so preaches Zarathustra, can only be achieved through affirmation. He 
says, “To redeem the past and transform every ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed 
it!’ – that alone would be redemption to me.” Through such affirmation 
of the past, through the ability to assert “thus I willed it,” one redeems 
oneself from the desire that the past be otherwise. The Will no longer 
experiences the past as a limitation on its power, but rather as an exten-
sion of itself.
One finds traces of this logic in Nietzsche’s most famous statement, 
“What does not kill me makes me stronger.” Surely the source of the 
sentiment’s popularity cannot lie in its actual veracity — it is demonstra-
bly false. Rather, the maxim’s appeal stems from the attitude it expresses. 
It fortifies one’s ability to cope with adversity, both present and past, and 
enables one to draw strength from all eventualities. Such an approach 
arms one against the inexorableness of what has gone before, not by ac-
tually altering the past, but by recasting it as, if not fatal, then inevitably 
empowering.
The unqualified affirmation that motivates Ecce homo stands at odds 
with Frost’s depiction of the friend who ostensibly inspired “The Road 
Not Taken.” Given Edward Thomas’s pervasive second-guessing, the po-
em’s title would suggest an element of regret. This is compounded by 
the irreversibility of the speaker’s choice: “knowing how way leads on to 
way / I doubted I should ever come back.” But what the lyrical subject 
actually claims to regret is not the particular road he chooses, but rather 
the fact that he has to choose at all. The formulation is as clear as it is 
odd: “Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,” the poem famously begins, 
“And sorry I could not travel both / And be one traveler, long I stood.” 
In this peculiar formulation, it is not the splitting of the roads that vexes 
him, but that he cannot split himself — he must “be one traveler” — that 
is why he “could not travel both” and therefore must make a choice. 
The individuum here longs to be a dividuum. The poem thus harnesses 
the quandary of choice to the issue of self-identity. Being an individual 
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demands choice, while at the same time, making choices is the stuff of 
individual identity. It is precisely that which makes “all the difference,” 
regardless of how comparatively well the road is travelled. When the lyri-
cal “I” pauses  —  “And I  —  / I took the one less traveled by”  —  the 
subject splits and multiplies, dramatizing this moment of decision. The 
decision here, however, is not which path to take — he made that choice 
at the beginning of the second stanza — but rather how to interpret and 
describe that choice. In this moment, he asserts his interpretive autonomy, 
that is, he determines the manner in which to interpret his own choice, 
and thereby that which derives from and defines our individuality.
The subtitle of Ecce homo — “how one becomes what one is” — makes 
this intellectual autobiography not so much a chronicle of historical 
events as an explanation. Such would also seem to be the anticipated 
objective of the lyrical subject’s future self, looking back on this mo-
ment at the splitting of the road: not to provide an objective account of 
events without interpretive intervention, but to explain how he became 
the person he became. The lyrical subject foresees himself interpreting 
this moment from a very particular perspective in the future in order to 
make sense of the present, not to preserve the past. Frost’s poem distin-
guishes between the lyrical subject who stands at the crossroads from the 
proleptic projection of the lyrical subject looking back on this moment. 
As Michael Orr would have it, the fourth stanza offers “a projection into 
the future [that looks] back upon the present as the past.” But there is 
actually no “present” in this poem, as there is no present tense  —  “two 
roads diverged”; “long I stood,” “I shall be,” etc. The lyrical subject does 
not actually stand at the crossroads; he is already looking back at the 
moment when he was standing at the crossroads. Why does this matter? 
Because what we have is not a true account of events compared to which 
the projected future account is merely an interpretation. The use of the 
past tense establishes a temporal distance between the speaker and the 
figure at the crossroads. This distance may be small, but Frost’s poem itself 
demonstrates how quickly perceptions can change: he claims he “took 
the other, as just as fair / And having perhaps the better claim, / Because 
it was grassy and wanted wear.” But then he seems to correct this im-
pression: “Though as for that the passing there / Had worn them really 
about the same.” The adverb “really” emphasizes the shift in perception. 
What we don’t know is when this shift occurs, at what point the two 
paths become indistinguishable from one another. Is it at that moment of 
decision, or only later when the speaker looks back? With this in mind, 
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the speaker for whom the two paths are interchangeable himself may be 
the outlier, where the future self ’s reading of one road being less trav-
eled aligns felicitously with the lyrical subject’s initial impression. Indeed, 
without this alignment, the reader could not understand what is meant 
by the phrase “the one less traveled by.”
It would seem the poem presents not a conflict between truth and 
self-deception, but a tension between diverse interpretations of an event: 
the lyrical subject’s interpretation of a past event followed by his specu-
lation regarding a possible future interpretation of that same event. The 
lyrical subject anticipates that from some future perspective this choice 
will serve as an explanation for events he has yet to experience and 
which cannot be foreseen. But even so, the future self he imagines will 
own that decision and affirm it by integrating it into his identity. If this 
poem leaves its audience with a choice, it need not be between a naive 
reading and a cynical one, between a celebration of rugged individualism 
and a mockery of self-deception. It is a poem about choice, a choice not 
just between two roads, or between two ways to interpret a poem, but 
between two ways to interpret one’s own past. It is a choice not between 
naiveté and self-deception, but between a nihilistic worldview, in which 
“shit just happens,” and the potential to make the “it was” of history into 
a “thus I willed it.”
